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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CLAUDE L. HEINER and DAN H.
HUNTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 880204-CA

S. J. GROVES & SONS CO., a
Minnesota corporation and WESTERN
STATES MINERAL CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appellants offer the following Reply to the Brief of
Respondents filed on February 10, 1989.

For the convenience of

the Court, Appellants will respond utilizing the organization
found in Respondents1 Brief.
While the standard of review cited by Respondents is
essentially correct (Respondents' Brief, p.

2) Appellants would

offer the following as a more concise and exact statement of this
standard: In reviewing the granting of a Motion to Dismiss on the
pleadings an appellate court is obliged to construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and to indulge all
reasonable inferences in their favor.

Penrod v. New and You

Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 197 6 WESTERN STATES AGREEMENT
IMPOSES ON WESTERN STATES AN
OBLIGATION TO MINE COAL THAT RUNS
IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS HEINER AND
HUNTER.
Respondents contend that Appellants have "tortured" the
interpretation of paragraph 7.10 of the 1976 Western States
Agreement in an attempt "to impose on Western States an
unconditional obligation to mine coal that runs in favor of
Heiner and Hunter," (Respondents' Brief, p.

10), Both

Respondents and the quoted portion of the opinion of the lower
court conclude that the language in the 1976 Agreement referring
to "obligations" of the 1975 Agreement are owed solely to Dickert
and Eddy and that there is no duty on the part of the defendants
to continue mining if Dickert and Eddy agree that such mining may
cease.

(Respondents1 Brief, pp.

10-12).

The argument of

Defendants would be correct had they not also promised Plaintiffs
to pay a royalty "on all coal produced and sold from the leased
property by buyer" as contained in paragraph 3.1(d) of the 1976
Agreement.
Respondents ignore this language which, under their
interpretation should read as follows: "Plaintiffs will receive
an overriding royalty on all coal produced and sold from the
leased property by buyer unless Dickert and Eddy decide that no
coal needs to be produced."
Even from the pleadings themselves, without any reference to
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the actual events in this transaction, it is obvious that the
plaintiffs expected to receive royalties based upon the continued
mining of the property as defined in the 1975 Agreement.
Otherwise, the overriding royalty provision would be completely
illusory and would have no enforceability in the future.
Every contract should be construed in light of the
reasonable expectations of the parties, as evidenced by the
purpose and language of the contract, so as to give effect to
what the parties intended at the time the contract was made.
Nixon & Nixon, Inc.

v. John New & Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d

144, 146 (Utah 1982); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah
1978).

In determining the parties' intentions, a court should

look to the written agreement executed by the parties, and when
agreements are executed substantially contemporaneously and are
clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and
harmonized, if possible.
(Utah App.

Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344

1987) .

The close proximity of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements together
with the clear language of the overriding royalty provision
require this Court to reverse the lower court in its erroneous
finding that the 1976 Agreement imposed no duty to mine running
in favor of Heiner and Hunter.

The reference to the duty to mine

in the 1976 Agreement, coupled with the overriding royalty
provision, create at least an issue of fact as to what the
parties intended.

Applying the standard of review in cases in

which a complaint is dismissed as a matter of law on the
pleadings themselves, the plaintiffs ar$ entitled to the reading
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of the 1976 Agreement that is most favorable to them.

That

reading requires the interpretation that the duty to mine runs in
their favor and is extinguished only if, as provided in the 1975
Agreement, all "mineable and merchantable coal" has been removed.
Under such a reading, Respondents' attempt to circumvent the 1976
Agreement by making a side deal with Dickert and Eddy is
actionable.
POINT II
THE 1976 WESTERN STATES AGREEMENT WAS
NOT AN ASSIGNMENT OF ALL OF HEINER'S
AND HUNTER'S INTERESTS IN THE DOG
VALLEY MINE.
Next, Respondents contend that as a matter of law the 1976
Agreement was an assignment which essentially eliminated any
rights or interest that Heiner and Hunter had in the transaction.
(Respondents' Brief, pp.

12-18).

In a nutshell, Respondents

argue "Western States agreed to step into the shoes of Heiner and
Hunter and to assume Heiner's and Hunter's obligations under the
1975 Dickert Agreement."

(Respondents' Brief, p. 13).

Respondents then cite three Utah cases which they claim clearly
stand for the proposition that the transfer by Heiner and Hunter
of their entire interest constituted an assignment as a matter of
law.

(Respondents' Brief, p. 14).
An analysis of these cases, however, does not support this

contention.

First, all three cases involved instances where one

document was the subject of the litigation.

In the instant case,

on the other hand, the 1976 Agreement included a variety of
documents including bills of sale of equipment, assigments of
mining claims, as well as the 1976 Agreement itself.
-4-

There is no

question but that the coal leases were assigned to the
respondents.

The question in this case, however, does not

concern the coal leases but concerns the language in the 1976
Agreement which governed the assignment of these leases.

Thus,

presence of a separate controlling document such as this is
absent from all of the cases relied upon tyy the respondents.
Second, none of the cases relied upon by the respondents
involved facts where the assignor was to receive compensation
based upon conditions which existed in the previous transaction.
None of these cases involve mining claims in which overriding
royalties are present.

Instead, all of the various interests

were transferred by the assignor to the assignee with no retained
interest in the operation of the enterprise.
Third, in all three cases the actual facts which occurred in
connection with the transactions, were relied upon by the court
in making its determinaton.
involved trials.
judgment.

Both the Robinson and Loader cases

The Jensen case involved a motion for summary

The conduct of the parties in these cases was an

important factor in determining their rights.

For example, in

the Jensen case cited by the respondents, 507 P.2d 713 (Utah
1973) the court focused upon what had happened after the transfer
by the second party to the third party.

The court noted:

The record reveals that for the first nine months
Dans Campers issued rental checks to OK Investments;
thereafter, all rental payments were made by Dans
Campers or Homes American Style, Inc. directly to
plaintiff. It is of significance that Dans Campers
continued to pay a rental of $225 for the initial term
of three years, as provided in the first lease, rather
than the increment to $250 after the first year, as
provided in the second lease. Another aspect of
significance was a letter from plaintiffs to OK
-5-

requesting remittance of OK's share of the property
taxes. This letter was forwarded by OK to Dan Siegel
with a notation that he should deal directly with
plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiffs directed their
request for taxes to Dan Siegel, who, after the death
of his father, on June 3, 1969, became president of
Dans Campers. 507 P.2d at 714. (Emphasis added).
Unlike these cases, however, the lower court dismissed
Plaintiffs1 Complaint as a matter of law with no understanding as
to the factual context of the transaction, at issue.

At the

very least there is an ambiguity created as to whether the 1976
Agreement intended that the royalty payments would continue under
the terms of the "merchantable coal" standard of the 1975
Agreement or whether the parties intended that the 1976 Agreement
and all royalty payments could be terminated at the whim of
Dickert and Eddy.
Next, Respondents contend that it is improper for Appellants
to focus on only a few words "sell" and "purchase" rather than
the entire agreement.

(Respondents* Brief, p.

16). This same

argument is applicable to Respondents since they are relying only
upon the documents showing assignment rather than the paragraphs
and other language contained in the 1976 Agreement showing a
retained royalty interest in the continuing operation of the
property.

Appellants agree that the entire contract as well as

the intention of the parties must be considered in construing any
single provision.

The difference is simply that both parties

construe the whole contract differently.
Finally, Respondents argue as to the hypothetical originally
proposed by Appellants concerning the sale of houses that it is
perfectly proper for C to buy out A and still have the remaining
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obligation to B but that "nothing in the 1976 Western States
Agreement imposes on Western States a separate and independent
obligation to mine coal that runs in favor of Heiner and Hunter."
(Respondents' Brief, p.

17). Again, Respondents thereby in

effect argue that the "merchantable coal" standard contained in
the 1976 Agreement is essentially meaningless since from the very
inception Respondents would only have had to go Dickert and Eddy
and to eliminate that standard and thereby eliminate any
expectation of royalties to Appellants.
The difficulty with Respondents' argument is that it assumes
that Heiner and Hunter, in defining the royalty to be paid, were
not relying upon the previous obligation and conditions of mining
established in the 1975 contract.

To illustrate this example,

assume that instead of selling a house as in the previous
example, A sells a service station business to B with the
provision that A will receive 10% of the business profits of the
service station.

B then sells the service station to C with the

provision that B shall receive an additional 5% of the service
station profits and that C fulfill B's obligation to pay 10% to
A.

C decides that the service station is no longer profitable

and wishes to build apartment buildings in its place.

He goes to

A and A agrees to release C from the obligation to keep the the
service station in business and pay him the 10% profit.
Respondents would contend that at that point B's interest in 5%
of the profits is automatically eliminated since it is solely
within A's discretion as to whether the service station would
continue.

Appellants, on the other hand, would contend B has his
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own interest in maintaining this service station business and
that C must also obtain permission from B before a change of use
in the land can occur.

Simply put, B's rights under the B-C

contract are meaningless unless the B-C contract is read to
impose upon C a contract continuing the obligation to B to keep
the service station open, rather than to merely satisfy A,
The lower court basically held that the drafters of the 1976
Agreement failed to clearly indicate their intent to include a
"merchantable coal" standard for terminating that agreement.
There is little question but that had the 1976 Agreement stated
that Respondents (i.e., the buyer) would owe a royalty "on all
coal produced and sold from the leased property by buyer and that
buyer should commence mining operations for coal with reasonable
dispatch and continue such mining operations until all of the
reasonably mineable and merchantable coal has been removed and
sold" Respondents would definitely have an underlying obligation
to Appellants to continue the mining operation, so long as there
were merchantable coal.

The absence of specific reincorporation

in the 1976 Agreement of the "duty to mine" requirement contained
in the 1975 Agreement caused the lower court to conclude that the
royalty provision only applied to whatever coal was taken from
the property and that there was no definite requirement as to
when the mining had to occur.
This reasoning is analogous to the previous example where B
simply provides that B is entitled to 5% of the "profits of the
business" (relying upon the previous agreement with A that such
service station business must continue at that location) as
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opposed to a more detailed clause in which it is stated that a
fixed percentage of the service station business would be paid to
B and that such service station business will continue
indefinitely at that location.
While it would be nice to always clearly state provisions at
the time a contract is entered into which may later be disputed,
the reality of commercial life is simply that many items are not
as clearly stated as they could be after a particular problem
subsequently arises.

However, a court shpuld not become focused

upon technical interpretations of language but should instead, as
noted previously, try to construe all of the agreements together
so as to best effect the intentions of the parties as evidenced
by the agreements.

It is just as logical in the instant case to

assume that the parties intended the royalty requirement of the
1976 Agreement to be based upon the duty to mine contained in the
1975 Agreement as to assume that Appellants were simply hoping
for a royalty should any mining occur on the property at the whim
of the respondents and Dickert and Eddy.
Again, it must be emphasized that this case arises on a
motion to dismiss in which no factual inquiry of the
circumstances surrounding this transaction has been made.

Only

if, as a matter of law, no cause of action can be stated, can
this decision to dismiss the complaint be sustained.
POINT III
THE 1981 DICKERT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED
A BREACH OF OBLIGATION TO HEINER AND
HUNTER.
Respondents argue that the 1981 Dicftert Agreement completely
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annihilated any obligations existing under the 1976 Agreement
between Appellants and Respondents.
18-20).

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

They contend that Respondents could have stopped mining

coal at any time and could have reconveyed the leases to Dickert
and Eddy but that since Respondents desired to maintain the
property they merely substituted monthly payments instead of
royalty payments paid on coal actually mined.
If Respondents' argument were correct, it is difficult to
udnerstand why paragraph 9.4 of the 1976 Agreement provides that
"Sellers (Appellants) shall have the right to damages .

.

. for

loss of their bargain by reason of the default of Buyer
(Respondents)." Clearly, this provision alone shows an intent
that the contract continue and that the property continue to be
mined; otherwise, there could be no bargain to be lost or basis
for damages.

It is apparent that the whole purpose of the 1975

and 1976 Agreements was to insure that the property would be
commercially mined and that ore would be extracted from it.
The 1981 Dickert Agreement can not circumvent the 1976
Agreement's requirement that an overriding royalty be paid nor
its provisions for damages in the event that the Appellants fail
to meet their obligations.

As noted earlier, Appellants were

never parties to the 1981 Agreement and therefore cannot be bound
by any terms that were agreed upon by the other parties.
POINT IV
WESTERN STATES DID NOT HONOR ITS
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH.
Finally, Respondents contend that it did not breach any
implied covenant of good faith in entering into the 1981 Dickert
-10-

Agreement.

(Respondents' Brief, pp.

20-$2).

First, Respondents

contend that the issue of bad faith was not raised by Appellants.
However, paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint clearly states
that by entering into the 1981 Agreement and by suspending mining
operations Respondents breached their duty under the Agreement to
extract mineable coal and pay Plaintiffs1 royalty.

Certainly,

part of this "breach" includes the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing that is found in all contracts.
Fashion Center Ltd., 104 Utah Adv.
1989); Beck v. Farmers Ins.

Rep.

Berube v.

4 (Utah, March 20,

Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

The failure to utilize good faith is a breach of contract just as
surely as a specific breach to specific terms.
By entering into the 1981 Agreement without any attempt to
involve Heiner and Hunter, Respondents clearly and unequivocably
breached the spirit and intent of the 1976 Agreement.

Appellants

did not sell and assign their interests in these mining
properties so that Respondents could hold onto them until such
time as they deemed it advisable to mine them.

Rather, both the

1975 and 1976 Agreements required an active mining of the
property in order that the overriding royalties be paid to
Appellants as well as Dickert and Eddy.

Respondents satisfied

Dickert and Eddy by agreeing to make them a monthly payment not
based upon ore produced but based upon a minimum monthly rental.
Had they not done so Dickert and Eddy could clearly have
terminated the contract for failure to comply with the mining
requirement.

By entering into the 1981 Agreement the respondents

satisfied Dickert and Eddy but such agreement did not eliminate
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the separate obligation existing to the appellants to mine the
property.
If Respondents had a -valid reason for not mining the
property and for holding it in direct violation of the mining
requirements of the 1975 lease, then it is reasonable that they
should have notified Appellants in order to satisfy them and to
give them some type of compensation during the inactive mining
period.

Instead, they completely ignored Appellants as if their

royalty did not exist.
Since "good faith" is a question of fact based upon the
circumstances, it cannot be said at this juncture whether
Respondents, as a matter of law, breached this requirement or
whether they were justified in taking the actions that they took.
However, in any event, Appellants are entitled to conduct
discovery and to have an evidentiary hearing upon the actions of
the Respondents so that a trier of fact can determine whether of
Respondents breached their duties under the 1976 Agreement.
CONCLUSION
A dismissal based upon the pleadings is a drastic remedy.
As shown, the 1976 Agreement may reasonably be interpreted as
urged by Appellants.

There is at least a question of fact as to

the proper interpretation such that this matter should be allowed
to proceed further for discovery and for evidentiary hearing.
The lower court was certainly incorrect in deciding as a matter
of law that under no set of circumstances could Appellants
prevail in their claim against Respondents.

The matter should

therefore be reversed for further proceedings.
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DATED this 31st day of March, 1989.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Reed L. Martineau
Stephen J. Hill
Attorneys for Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to David K. Isom,
Attorney for Respondents, 1600-87 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 31st day of March,
1989.
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